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All You Always Wanted to Know About AntiViruses (and I had to hands-on to tell you!)





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AntiViruses under the Microscope: A Hands-On Perspective


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
0x0. AV products are not the same as AV engines

Engine Sharing



0x1. AVs have multiple components

AV Architecture



0x2. Whitelists are still widely used

Whitelisting

```
<!-- Entry which exe name fit blacklist and also whitelist, is NOT blacklisted -->
<whitelist>
  <item>
    <exeName CI Sub>steamservice.exe</exeName CI Sub>
    <TUID CI Sub>STEAM</TUID CI Sub>
  </item>
  <item>
    <uniqueId CI Sub>service:aspnet state</uniqueId CI Sub>
    <TUID CI Sub>{EDDF99D9-9FE3-4871-A7DB-D1522C51EE9A}</TUID CI Sub>
  </item>
  <item>
    <exeName CI Sub>Dropbox.exe</exeName CI Sub>
    <TUID CI Sub>DROPBOX</TUID CI Sub>
  </item>
  <!-- grouping MS Onedrive bins under one program -->
  <item force="1">
    <exeName CI Sub>AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\OneDrive.exe</exeName CI Sub>
    <TUID CI Sub>ONEDRIVE</TUID CI Sub>
  </item>
  <item force="1">
    <exeName CI Sub>OneDriveStandaloneUpdater.exe</exeName CI Sub>
    <TUID CI Sub>ONEDRIVE</TUID CI Sub>
  </item>
  <item force="1">
```

Whitelisting

🗾 🚄 🔛	
; Expor	ted entry 160. FSE_CheckFileInWhiteList
and the second s	64fastcall FSE_CheckFileInWhiteList(int)
-	FSE_CheckFileInWhiteList
FSE_Che	ckFileInWhiteList proc near
var_68=	qword ptr -68h
var_60=	dword ptr -60h
	xmmword ptr -58h
	xmmword ptr -48h
var_38=	qword ptr -38h
push	rbx
push	rbp
push	
push	rdi
push	r14
sub	rsp, 60h
mov	<pre>rax, cs:security_cookie</pre>
xor	rax, rsp
mov	[rsp+88h+var_38], rax
xor	edi, edi
mov	rbx, r9
mov	r14d, r8d
mov	ebp, edx
mov	
test	r9, r9
jz	short loc_180133BAA

Whitelisting

<pre>var_18= dword ptr -18h var_10= word ptr -10h arg_0= qword ptr 8 arg_8= qword ptr 10h arg_10= qword ptr 18h mov [rsp+arg_0], rbx mov [rsp+arg_10], rbx mov [rsp+arg_10], rsi push rdi sub rsp, 30h mov esi, r9d movzx ebx, r8w mov edi, edx mov rbp, rcx call whitelist1 mov rcx, rax mov [rsp+38h+var_10], bx mov r9d, edi mov [rsp+38h+var_18], esi xor r8d, r8d mov rdx, rbp call sub_180132A50 mov rbp, [rsp+38h+arg_0] mov rbp, [rsp+38h+arg_8] mov rb, [rsp+38h+arg_10]</pre>
<pre>mov [rsp+arg_0], rbx mov [rsp+arg_8], rbp mov [rsp+arg_10], rsi push rdi sub rsp, 30h mov esi, r9d movzx ebx, r8w mov edi, edx mov rbp, rcx call whitelist1 mov rcx, rax mov [rsp+38h+var_10], bx mov r9d, edi mov [rsp+38h+var_18], esi xor r8d, r8d mov rdx, rbp call sub_180132A50 mov rbx, [rsp+38h+arg_0] mov rbp, [rsp+38h+arg_8]</pre>
<pre>mov [rsp+arg_8], rbp mov [rsp+arg_10], rsi push rdi sub rsp, 30h mov esi, r9d movzx ebx, r8w mov edi, edx mov rbp, rcx call whitelist1 mov rcx, rax mov [rsp+38h+var_10], bx mov r9d, edi mov [rsp+38h+var_18], esi xor r8d, r8d mov rdx, rbp call sub_180132A50 mov rbx, [rsp+38h+arg_0] mov rbp, [rsp+38h+arg_8]</pre>
movzx eax, al add rsp, 30h
pop rdi retn FPI_ScanFile endp

0x3. Companies make money selling whitelisting data

Selling Whitelists




AV-ATLAS @avatlasorg · 5 h

Flare #Whitelist crawls over 100 #download portals for new or updated #Windows #software. AV-TEST downloads these products, stores the download #URL and automatically installs and analyzes them.

...

#Infosec #Cybersecurity

AV-ATLAS Flare Whitelist Windows Software Products



Selling Whitelists



Em resposta a @avatlasorg

When a product is installed, many changes are made to the computer. For example, **#registry** entries and files are created or changed. All these actions are recorded and stored. In total, our database contains over one million software products and over 70,000,000 collected files.

raduzir Tweet

AV-ATLAS Flare Whitelist Windows Last Processed Products



6:40 AM · 15 de jul de 2021 · Twitter Web App

0x4. Signatures are still widely used


























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IL INFAMPORATION

Signature Extraction Algorithm




The extracted signatures

marcus@Palpatine:/tmp/extracted_sigs\$ file * egre	p -v "data empty"
_AhnLab-V3_xmda.exe.sig:	dBase IV DBT of \377\377.DBF, blocks size 16711935, next free block index 255, 1st item "o"
_Gridinsoft_xmda.exe.sig:	dBase IV DBT of \377\377.DBF, blocks size 16711935, next free block index 255, 1st item "o"
_Gridinsoft_xmdb.exe.sig:	lif file
_Jiangmin_ass.exe.sig:	DOS executable (COM)
_Malwarebytes_xmda.exe.sig:	dBase IV DBT of \377\377.DBF, blocks size 16711935, next free block index 255, 1st item "o"
_Malwarebytes_xmdb.exe.sig:	lif file
_Zillya_DetalhesFaturaVivo201610Ver.exe.sig:	COM executable for DOS
marcus@Palpatine:/tmp/extracted_sigs\$ 🗌	


Signature Extraction Algorithm in Practice

marcus@Palpatine:/tmp/extracted_sigs\$ md5sum *
639b5eb4bbd80d165f5e4c55a404795d _Antiy-AVL_mueb2.exe.sig
639b5eb4bbd80d165f5e4c55a404795d _Comodo_mueb2.exe.sig
560b39a665096773134e0d45fe6f8d71 _Ikarus_mueb2.exe.sig
marcus@Palpatine:/tmp/extracted_sigs\$ []

Signature Usage: Prevalence



Signature sizes




0x5. (Packed Malware) Detection is also a cost-benefit trade-off

Packers

Table 9: A	V's Sup	oported Pac	kers. Not	all AVs su	pport the dete	ction of the sa	ame packers.
Packer	UPX	Themida	Telock	PeLock	Armadillo	Morphine	VMProtect
Avast	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Bitdefender		1	1	1	1	1	
Fsecure	1	1	1		1	1	
TrendMicro	1						

UPX support



0x6. AVs largely rely on userland hooking for data collection

Injected Libraries and hooks

	C:\Users\Win\Desktop\DLLChecker\x64\Release\DLLChecker.exe	-	×
C:\Window C:\Window C:\Progra C:\Window C:\Window	 Win\Desktop\DLLChecker\x64\Release\DLLChecker.exe \$\\$Y\$TEM32\ntdl1.dl1 \$\system32\KERNEL32.DLL m Files\Avast Software\Avast\aswhook.dl1 \$\system32\KERNELBASE.dl1 \$\system32\Apphelp.dl1 \$\\$Y\$TEM32\M\$UCR110.dl1		
C:\Window C:\Window C:\Progra C:\Window C:\Window	Win\Desktop\DLLChecker\x64\Release\DLLChecker.exe s\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll s\system32\KERNEL32.DLL m Files\Avast Software\Avast\aswhook.dll s\system32\KERNELBASE.dll s\system32\KERNELBASE.dll s\system32\apphelp.dll s\SYSTEM32\MSUCR110.dll		
C:\Window C:\Window C:\Progra C:\Window C:\Window	Win\Desktop\DLLChecker\x64\Release\DLLChecker.exe s\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll s\system32\KERNEL32.DLL m Files\Avast Software\Avast\aswhook.dll s\system32\KERNELBASE.dll s\system32\Apphelp.dll s\SYSTEM32\MSUCR110.dll		~





Libs and Machine Learning: A Discussion

Table: **DLL Hooking.** Can we assume a unified model?

Antivirus	Functions	Libraries
Avast	17	2
BitDefender	132	11
Fsecure	17	4
VIPRE	45	3

0x7. AVs largely rely on kernel driver for self-protection

Kernel Filters and Callbacks

Table 31: Malware Bytes. Kernel Drivers.								
Driver	Description	Imports						
		FltStartFiltering						
		PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine						
farflt.sys	Anti Ransomware	${\bf PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine}$						
		${\it PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx}$						
		KeStackAttachProcess						
		PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine						
mbae 64.sys	Anti Exploit	PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine						
		KeStackAttachProcess						
		KeStackAttachProcess						
mhamahamalaan aya	Chameleon	PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx						
mbamchameleon.sys	Unameleon	${\it PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine}$						
		${\it PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine}$						
mbamelam.sys	Early Launch							
mhamawiaaanny aya	Surias Army	PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx						
mbamswissarmy.sys	Swiss Army	KeStackAttachProcess						
		KeStackAttachProcess						
mbam.sys	Real Time Protection	PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx						
		PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine						
		FwpmCalloutAdd0						
mwac.sys	Web Protection	PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine						
		${\it PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx}$						

Access Control

Table 13: Filesystem accesses prevented by the AVs. AVs block access to certain directories to avoid system infection to ensure self-protection.


ĀV	Function	Paths							
	Self-Protection	$C:\operatorname{ProgramData}Avast Software$							
Avast	Sen-r lotection	$C: \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \$							
Avast	System Protection	$C: \ \ Crypto \ \ \ RSA \ \ \ Machine Keys \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \$							
	System Protection	$C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\RAC\StateData\RacMetaData.dat$							
	Self-Protection	C: ProgramData Kaspersky Lab							
		$C:$ Recycle.Bin \setminus							
		$c:\operatorname{ProgramData}\operatorname{Menu}$ Iniciar							
		$c: \label{eq:linear} c: \label{eq:linear} Contend \ Contend\ \ Contend \ Contend \ C$							
Kaspersky	System Protection	$c:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\$							
Казретяку		$c: Windows \\ System 32 \\ LogFiles \\ Fax \\ I$							
		$c:\Windows\System 32\LogFiles\Firewall$							
		$c:\Windows\System 32\LogFiles\WMI$							
		$c: eq:local_loc$							
	Internet Protection	c: \Users \Default \AppData Local 							
		$c:\Users\Default\Cookies$							
MalwareBytes	Self-Protection	$C:\operatorname{Program Files}\operatorname{Malwarebytes}$							

0x8. AVs "spy" on your network traffic

Network Process: avp (Kaspersky)

CPView - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com															×
File Options Process View Help															
Process /	PID	Protocol	Local A	Local Port	Remote Re	emote	State	Sent Pa S	Sent Byte	s Rovd P	a Ro	vd Bvt			^
© avp.exe	2992	TCP	win7-pc	49378	66.110.49.8 http		FIN WAIT2								
Ø avp.exe	2356	TCP		49390	38.117.98 http		ESTABLI	28	5.0	77	69	90.512			
◎ avp.exe	2992	TCP		49391	66.110.49 http		ESTABLI	1		15	1	135			
^a ksde.exe	4060	TCP		49342	40.127.15 http		ESTABLI	•							
E ksde oxe	4060	TCP	win7-ne	49347	66 110 49 8 http		ESTABL						_		
🛎 💙 avp.exe			29	992	TCP		win7-pc	4939	1	66 1	10.4	9 https			
8												•			
🖥 🛱 ksde.exe			40	060	TCP	1	win7-pc	4934	.2	40.1	27.1	5 https 👘			
E @															
<u>la kode eve</u>			<u></u>	160.	TCP	1	<u>kinZnng</u>	493/	7	66.1	10.4	9.8 http			
services.exe	492	TCP	Win7-PC	49156	Win7-PC 0		LISTENING								
services.exe	492	TCPV6	[0:0:0:0:0:	. 49156	[0:0:0:0:0: 0		LISTENING								
svchost.exe	748	TCP		epmap	Win7-PC 0		LISTENING								
svchost.exe	848	TCP	Win7-PC	49153	Win7-PC 0		LISTENING								
[■] svchost.exe	912	TCP	Win7-PC	49154	Win7-PC 0		LISTENING								
svchost.exe	848	UDP	Win7-PC	bootpc	* *			2	6	00					
[■] svchost.exe	1448	UDP	win7-pc	ssdp	* *						42	6.093			
svchost.exe	1448	UDP	Win7-PC	ssdp	* *										=
[■] svchost.exe	1072	UDP	Win7-PC	ws-disco	* *										
svchost.exe	1448	UDP	Win7-PC	ws-disco	* *										
svchost.exe	1448	UDP	Win7-PC	ws-disco	* *										
svchost.exe	1072	UDP	Win7-PC	ws-disco	* *										
svchost.exe	1168	UDP	Win7-PC	llmnr	* *										
svchost.exe	1072	UDP	Win7-PC	52307	* *										
svchost.exe	1448	UDP	Win7-PC	56359	* *										
svchost.exe	1448	UDP	win7-pc	58221	* *			3	3	99					
[■] svchost.exe	1448	UDP	Win7-PC	58222	* *			3	3	99		🔮 Kaspersky Anti-Viru	15	~ ×	1
svchost.exe	1072	UDP	Win7-PC	65155	* *									* ^	
[™] svchost.exe	748	TCPV6	[0:0:0:0:0:	. epmap	[0:0:0:0:0: 0		LISTENING					Desinfetando o mal	ware corona2.EXE		
svchost.exe	2416	TCPV6	[0:0:0:0:0:	. 3587	[0:0:0:0:0: 0		LISTENING					Objeto:			
[■] svchost.exe	848	TCPV6	[0:0:0:0:0:	. 49153	[0:0:0:0:0: 0		LISTENING					\\vboxsrv\Download	s\corona2.EXE		
svchost.exe	912	TCPV6	[0:0:0:0:0:	. 49154	[0:0:0:0:0: 0		LISTENING					Detalhes			
svchost.exe	848	UDPV6	lfe80:0:0:	546	* *							-			*
Endpoints: 115 Established: 13 Listening: 25 Time Wait: 43	Close Wait: 0										_				
🕘 🤌 🚞 🔍 🚱													PT 🍝 隆 🛱 🗊	13:38 17/08/2020	

Network Certificates



Snort Rules (VIPRE)

0x9. AVs store files in quarentines

Quarantine: Encoded File Information

```
<threatAdviceDetails>Quarantine</threatAdviceDetails>
   <customData/>
   <fixes>
       <fix traceType="4"
                dispValue="C:\Users\Win7\Desktop\001"
                actionType="3"
                isTransient="false">
            <originalAttributes>
                <attr n="path"
                        v="C:\Users\Win7\Desktop\001"/>
            </originalAttributes>
            <quarantineAttributes>
                <attr n="guarantineName"
                        v="{3ACCBD54-B1E0-4417-AD3F-353439A1AF06} ENC2"/>
                <attr n="isEncrypted"
                        v="true"/>
                <attr n="quarantineMethod"
                        v="0"/>
            </guarantineAttributes>
       </fix>
   </fixes>
</SBCSQuarantineRecordXML>
```

Quarantine

marcus@tux:/tmp/quarantine\$ ls -lh total 616K -rw-r--r-- 1 marcus marcus 305K abr 17 15:26 001 -rw-rw-r-- 1 marcus marcus 305K abr 17 15:26 {3ACCBD54-B1E0-4417-A<u>D3F-353439A1AF06} ENC2</u>

Quarantine: Original File

marcus@tu	x:/tmp	o/qu	arai	ntir	ne\$	he>	kdum	ıp -(2 00	91	he	ead	- 1(9		
00000000	4d 5a	90	00	03	00	00	00	04	00	00	00	ff	ff	00	00	MZ
00000010	b8 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	40	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000020	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	[]
00000030	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	e8	00	00	00	[
00000040	0e 11	ba	0e	00	b 4	09	cd	21	b 8	01	4c	cd	21	54	68	I.!Th
00000050	69 73	3 20	70	72	6f	67	72	61	6d	20	63	61	6e	6e	6f	is program canno
00000060	74 20) 62	65	20	72	75	6e	20	69	6e	20	44	4f	53	20	t be run in DOS
00000070	6d 61	64	65	2e	0d	0d	0a	24	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	mode\$
00000080	13 41	1b	b1	57	20	75	e2	57	20	75	e2	57	20	75	e2	.AW u.W u.W u.
00000090	5a 72	2 aa	e2	76	20	75	e2	5a	72	94	e2	12	20	75	e2	Zrv u.Zr u.

Quarantine: Encoded File

marcus@tux:/tmp/guarantine\$ hexdump -C \{3ACCBD54-B1E0-4417-AD3F-353439A1AF06\}_ENC2 | head -10 00000000 27 b4 5b 5c 22 cd b8 a9 22 75 0f 94 db 72 92 80 |'.[\"..."u...r..| 00000010 0b 78 b5 ea dc 63 22 8a c7 12 8f 24 5e f5 37 1c .x...c"....\$^.7. e0 9b 75 23 6a 96 28 e5 8d 70 42 25 ad 74 a6 ed 00000020 ..u#j.(..pB%.t..| ba 6b 55 d4 0c 17 b1 e0 00000030 e9 fe 4f cd 85 9e 9b 07 |.kU.....0....| fb eb 35 1b 0a c4 ed cd 51 38 11 74 ad 47 12 8a ..5....Q8.t.G.. 00000040 00000050 ae 4c 14 0e 23 20 3d e3 06 d5 a6 0d 7c 49 f8 4e |.L..# =....|I.N| 00000060 95 b3 f2 6c 3c a9 39 bb 8f 0f fd 64 d6 47 cd 1d ...l<.9...d.G..| 00000070 57 79 fe c5 45 10 82 42 30 30 09 b6 4f 1b e9 fb |Wy..E..B00..0...| 00000080 8e 67 06 0a 82 47 76 f2 60 03 ac 5d ca 57 5d 83 .g...Gv.`..].W].| 00000090 a9 16 07 e1 20 10 1e 99 a8 58 04 eb cb c6 f0 adX.....

0xA. AVs collect lots of data from you and about you

Databases and Logs

🔲 DailyFwStat 🔻	Weekly	UpdStat 🔻	Counter 🔻	🔲 YearlyUpdStat 🔹 🔻] DailyUpdStat 🔹 🔻		YearlyFwStat			MonthlyFwStat	V
💡 Id INT	💡 Id INT		💡 Id INT	💡 Id INT	?	Id INT	1	Id INT			💡 Id INT	
♦ Time INT	Time INT		CounterId INT	Time INT	0.	Time INT	> Time I	NT		○ Time INT		
○ BytesIn INT	StreamingL	Jpdate_Count INT	Time INT	StreamingUpdate_Count INT	0	StreamingUpdate_Count INT	<	Bytes	n INT			
◇ BytesOut INT			Count INT				<	Bytes	Out INT		SytesOut INT	
♦ ItemType INT	Decenn	aryUpdStat 🔻				MonthlyUpdStat 🔹	<	ItemT	/pe INT		○ ItemType INT	
ItemSubtype INT	💡 Id INT		🗌 Path 🛛 🔻	Process 🔻	?	Id INT	<	> ItemS	ubtype INT		ItemSubtype INT	
	Time INT		💡 Id INT	💡 Id INT	0	Time INT						
	StreamingL	Jpdate_Count INT	Name TEXT	◇ Name TEXT	0	StreamingUpdate_Count INT			User	-	Adapter	
									7 Id INT		7 Id INT	
YearlyResStat	•	MonthlyResSt	tat 🔻	WeeklyResStat		DecennaryResStat			♦ Name TEXT		Name TEXT	
💡 Id INT		💡 Id INT		💡 Id INT		💡 Id INT						
○ Time INT		○ Time INT		♀ Time INT		○ Time INT			Event 1	-	WeeklyFwStat	
FileSystemShield_Scanner	d INT	FileSystemShield_S	Scanned INT	FileSystemShield_Scanned INT		FileSystemShield_Scanned I	INT		7 Id INT		7 Id INT	
FileSystemShield_Infected	d INT	○ FileSystemShield_I	infected INT	FileSystemShield_Infected INT		FileSystemShield_Infected I	NT		○ Time INT		○ Time INT	
IMShield_Scanned INT		IMShield_Scanned	INT	IMShield_Scanned INT		IMShield_Scanned INT		Level INT		O BytesIn INT		
IMShield_Infected INT		IMShield_Infected	INT	IMShield_Infected INT		IMShield_Infected INT		O Module INT		O BytesOut INT		
P2PShield_Scanned INT		P2PShield_Scanned	d INT	P2PShield_Scanned INT		P2PShield_Scanned INT	MessageId INT			↓ ItemType INT		
P2PShield_Infected INT		P2PShield_Infected	INT INT	P2PShield_Infected INT		P2PShield_Infected INT			♦ Param1 INT		○ ItemSubtype INT	
EmailShield_Scanned INT	1 1	EmailShield_Scann	ed INT	CEMAINSHIELD EXAMPLE FOR THE SCANNED INT		EmailShield_Scanned INT					,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	
EmailShield_Infected INT	:	EmailShield_Infector	ed INT	EmailShield_Infected INT		EmailShield_Infected INT		○ Param3 TEXT		DecennaryFwStat		
WebShield_Scanned INT		○ WebShield_Scanne	d INT	WebShield_Scanned INT		WebShield_Scanned INT		Param4 TEXT	1	Id INT		
WebShield_Infected INT		WebShield_Infecte	d INT	WebShield_Infected INT		WebShield_Infected INT				Time INT		
NetworkShield_Scanned I	INT	NetworkShield_Sca	anned INT	NetworkShield_Scanned INT		ONetworkShield_Scanned INT		ScanSession		O BytesIn INT		
NetworkShield_Infected I	INT	NetworkShield_Infe	ected INT	NetworkShield_Infected INT		NetworkShield_Infected INT	r.		💡 Id INT		BytesOut INT	
ScriptShield_Scanned INT	r i	ScriptShield_Scann	ed INT	ScriptShield_Scanned INT		ScriptShield_Scanned INT				♦ ItemType INT		
ScriptShield_Infected INT	(I	ScriptShield_Infect	ed INT	ScriptShield_Infected INT		ScriptShield_Infected INT		TaskGuid TEXT		♦ ItemSubtype INT		
AntiSpamShield_Scanned	INT	AntiSpamShield_Sc	anned INT	AntiSpamShield_Scanned INT		AntiSpamShield_Scanned IN	NΤ		TestedFiles INT		o Remoublype Int	
AntiSpamShield_Infected	INT	AntiSpamShield_In	fected INT	AntiSpamShield_Infected INT		AntiSpamShield_Infected IN						
BehaviorShield_Scanned :	INT	BehaviorShield_Sca	anned INT	BehaviorShield_Scanned INT		SehaviorShield_Scanned IN	т	TestedData INT				
BehaviorShield_Infected I	INT	BehaviorShield_Inf	ected INT	BehaviorShield_Infected INT		BehaviorShield_Infected INT			InfectedFiles INT			
ExchangeShield_Scanned	INT	ExchangeShield_So	canned INT	ExchangeShield_Scanned INT		ExchangeShield_Scanned INT			Started INT			
ExchangeShield_Infected INT			fected INT	ExchangeShield_Infected INT		ExchangeShield_Infected INT			RunTime INT			
SharepointShield_Scanned INT			Scanned INT	SharepointShield_Scanned INT		SharepointShield_Scanned INT			Status INT			
SharepointShield_Infected INT			infected INT	SharepointShield_Infected INT		SharepointShield_Infected INT			CERTOR INT			
AntiRansomwareShield_S	ntiRansomwareShield_Scanned I			AntiRansomwareShield_Scanned I		AntiRansomwareShield_Scale	d I	Percent INT				
AntiRansomwareShield_Infected INT			nield_Infected INT	AntiRansomwareShield_Infected IN	T AntiRansomwareShield_Infected INT				LastScanned TEXT			
BrowserProtection_Scanned INT			Scanned INT	BrowserProtection_Scanned INT		BrowserProtection_Scanned INT			♦ Flags INT			
BrowserProtection_Infected INT O BrowserProtection_Infected				SrowserProtection_Infected INT		O BrowserProtection_Infected	г					
SecureDnsShield_Scanner	d INT	SecureDnsShield_S	Scanned INT	SecureDnsShield_Scanned INT		SecureDnsShield_Scanned I						
SecureDnsShield_Infected	d INT	♦ SecureDnsShield_I	nfected INT	SecureDnsShield_Infected INT		SecureDnsShield_Infected I						

AV Telemetry

sglite> .table TCMFeedBack TKOName TCmdLine TDnsMeta TEadConfig TFile TFileOP TRegKey TFilePath TInjectionModuleInfo TInvokeRoute TIpMeta TSHA1 TKO sqlite> select * from TFile; 1|NullFileNode|1813234489|1 2|coreServiceShell.exe|4230288984|2 3|TmsaInstance64.exe|722691509|4 4|svchost.exe|450324902|3 5|taskeng.exe|760108171|3 6|TmopExtIns.exe|929943652|5 7 conhost.exe 714646352 3 8|TmopExtIns32.exe|1118374559|5 9|VBoxTray.exe|2678778887|3 10|System|748621531|1

TModuleHistorv TModuleTree TNetworkConnection **TPopularString** TRegValueData TRegValueName TRegistryHistory TSHA12File

TServerNameMeta TSessionMeta TSystemConfig TURL TURL2SHA1History TURLHost TURLID TURLLanding TUpnMeta

File Cache



URL cache



0xB. Caches can also be exploited



X



















Attacks due to caching



0xC. AVs updates definitions **AND** components

AV update in a month



Downloads in plain HTTP

 File
 Edit
 View
 Go
 Capture
 Analyze
 Statistics
 Telephony
 Wireless
 Tools
 Help

 Image: Image

Apply a display filter ... <Ctrl-/>

No.	Time	2	Source	Destination	Protoco *	Length Info
	5104 36.	395453	23.14.87.136	192.168.15.3	HTTP	769 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
	5116 36.	538672	192.168.15.3	23.14.87.136	HTTP	189 GET /vps18tiny/part-jrog2-e0.vpx HTTP/1.1
	5121 36.	609982	23.14.87.136	192.168.15.3	HTTP	640 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
	5133 36.	730413	192.168.15.3	23.14.87.136	HTTP	201 GET /vps18tiny/part-vps_windows-20082403.vpx HTTP/1.1
	5151 36.	830104	23.14.87.136	192.168.15.3	HTTP	2701 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
	5573 54.	871102	192.168.15.3	23.14.87.136	HTTP	184 GET /vps18tiny/jrog2-e0.vpx HTTP/1.1
	7054 56.	113954	23.14.87.136	192.168.15.3	HTTP	7852 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
	7082 56.3	301645	192.168.15.3	23.14.87.161	HTTP	185 GET /iavs9x/ais_cmp_bpc-7e7.vpx HTTP/1.1
	7087 56.3	367839	23.14.87.161	192.168.15.3	HTTP	755 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
	7099 56.	480870	192.168.15.3	23.14.87.161	HTTP	193 GET /iavs9x/ais_cmp_cleanup_x86-7d6.vpx HTTP/1.1
	9922 57.	736674	23.14.87.161	192.168.15.3	HTTP	7068 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
	9944 58.	032712	192.168.15.3	23.14.87.161	HTTP	194 GET /iavs9x/ais_cmp_datascan_x86-80b.vpx HTTP/1.1
	10870 58.	610200	23.14.87.161	192.168.15.3	HTTP	12138 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
	10901 58.	780282	192.168.15.3	23.14.87.161	HTTP	192 GET /iavs9x/ais_cmp_gamingmode-857.vpx HTTP/1.1
	12537 59.	697491	23.14.87.161	192.168.15.3	HTTP	10886 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
	12566 59.	890486	192.168.15.3	23.14.87.161	HTTP	189 GET /iavs9x/ais_cmp_idp_x86-856.vpx HTTP/1.1
	15876 60.	901484	23.14.87.161	192.168.15.3	HTTP	2348 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
	15892 61.3	208869	192.168.15.3	23.14.87.161	HTTP	188 GET /iavs9x/ais_cmp_pwdman-848.vpx HTTP/1.1
	15984 61		23 1/ 87 161	192 168 15 3	HTTP	2879 HTTP/1 1 200 OK
	15998 61.4 18087 62.3	4 102 16	0 15 2	23.14.87.161	HTTP	196 GET /iavs9x/ais_cmp_rescuedisk_x86-80b.vpx HTTP/1.1
				23.14.07.101	niir	190 GET / Tav S5X/ ats_clip_rescuedtsk_x00-00b.vpx http://
	18107 62.4 20748 63	23 1/	87 161	192.168.15.3	HTTP	96 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
	20748 63	20.14.	101.101	192,100,10,0	niir	
	20782 63.	560417	192.168.15.3	23.14.87.161	HTTP	194 GET /iavs9x/ais_cmp_swhealth_x86-80b.vpx HTTP/1.1
4			00 11 07 101	100 100 15 0	11770	10000 UTTB (1 1 000 OV

VPX structure

0000	48	4c	45	4e	b0	00	00	00	46	43	4e	54	01	00	00	00	HLENFCNT ← VPX HEADER
0010	46	49	4c	45	1e	00	00	00	25	52	4f	50	41	54	48	36	FILE%ROPATH6
0020	34	25	5c	54	75	бе	65	75	70	53	6d	61	72	74	53	63	4%\TuneupSmartSc
0030	61	бe	2e	64	6C	6C	4f	46	46	53	04	00	00	00	00	00	an.dllOFFS
0040	00	00	46	4c	45	4e	04	00	00	00	80	be	70	00	56	45	FLENp.VE
0050	52	48	04	00	00	00	06	00	14	00	56	45	52	4c	04	00	RHVERL
0060	00	00	00	00	c1	23	54	49	4d	45	04	00	00	00	8a	1a	#TIME
0070	17	5f	46	4d	44	35	10	00	00	00	04	8b	4d	bf	ac	71	FMD5Mq
0080	aб	34	c1	bf	01	4e	d1	77	4b	92	44	49	46	54	0e	00	.4N.wK.DIFT
0090	00	00	44	49	46	46	50	45	32	7c	4e	4f	53	4d	52	54	DIFFPE2 NOSMRT
00a0	54	45	46	4c	08	00	00	00	ff	ff	3f	00	00	00	00	00	TEFL?
00b0	4d	5a	90	00	03	00	00	00	04	00	00	00	ff	ff	00	00	MZ ← PE HEADER
00c0	b 8	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	40	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	@
00d0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	[
00e0				00					00	00	00	00	50	01	00	00	P
00f0	0e	1f	ba	0e	00	b4	09	cd	21	b 8	01	4c	cd	21	54	68	!L.!Th
0100	69	73	20	70	72	6f	67	72	61	6d	20	63	61	бе	бе	6f	is program canno
0110	74	20	62	65	20	72	75	бе	20	69	бе	20	44	4f	53	20	t be run in DOS
0120	6d	6f	64	65	2e	0d	0d	0a	24	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	mode\$
0130	b 6	f5	86	1c	f2	94	e8	4f	f2	94	e8	4f	f2	94	e8	4f	00
0140	бс	34	2f	4f	f1	94	e8	4f	27	f9	ec	4e	fa	94	e8	4f	l4/00'N0
0150	27	f9	eb	4e	f1	94	e8	4f	27	f9	e9	4e	f4	94	e8	4f	'N0'N0
0160	27	f9	ed	4e	d 9	94	e8	4f	a9	fc	ec	4e	f7	94	e8	4f	'N0N0
0170	fb	ec	7b	4f	ea	94	e8	4f	68	fa	ec	4e	f9	94	e8	4f	{00hN0
0180	f2	94	e8	4f	f9	94	e8	4f	69	fa	ed	4e	e3	94	e8	4f	00iN0
0190	a9	fc	ef	4e	f3	94	e8	4f	a9	fc	ee	4e	f6	94	e8	4f	NONO
01a0	бе	fa	ed	4e	f1	94	e8	4f			e9						nN0N0
01b0	6e	fa	e9	4e	f1	94	e8	4f	f2	94	e9	4f	a0	90	e8	4f	nN00
01c0	6d	fa	e1	4e	63	95	e8	4f	6d	fa	e8	4e	f3	94	e8	4f	[mNcOmN0]
01d0	6d	fa	17	4f	f3	94	e8	4f	f2	94	7f	4f	f0	94	e8	4f	[m000]

For Programmers

1	typedef VPX {
2	typedef header {
3	<pre>char filename[];</pre>
4	int offset;
5	int version;
6	}
7	<pre>typedef blob data[bytes];</pre>
8	typedef signature {
9	typedef hashes;
0	typedef signatures;
1	typedef certificates;
2	}
3	}


Code 1: Avast's VPX file structure.

Extracting PE from VPX

marcus@tux:/tmp/av\$ python extract.py ais_cmp_cleanup_x64-7d6.vpx
Found valid VPX file ais_cmp_cleanup_x64-7d6.vpx
Dumping signatures to ais_cmp_cleanup_x64-7d6.vpx.sig
Dumping content to ais_cmp_cleanup_x64-7d6.vpx.pe
marcus@tux:/tmp/av\$ file ais_cmp_cleanup_x64-7d6.vpx.pe
ais_cmp_cleanup_x64-7d6.vpx.pe: PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows


0xD. AVs security depends on their integrity

Patching in secure boot mode



0xE. AV's security depends on pristine installations

Assume pristine installation



Pristine installation attempt

Lixeira					
Google Chrome					
Dbgview - Atalho			M	Malwarebytes - Programa de Instalação 🛛 – 🗆 🗙	
0:N_	Administrador: Prom	pt de Comando - python blocker.py – 🗖 🗙	Malwa	ire bytes	
Prompt de Comando	c:\Users\Vin\Desktop>python blocker	pr de comando - pydron blocker.py		alando enquanto o Malwarebytes é instalado no seu computador.	
Visual Studio 2012		Erro CAProgram	Extraind C:\Prog	o arquivos am FilesMalwarebytesWnI-Malware\TelemetryControllerImpt.dll	
Bloco de Notas		Files')Malwarebytes'Anti-Malware\TelemetryControllerImpI.dll Ocorreu um erro ao tentar renomear um arquivo no diretório de destino: MoveFile Iahlou; código 5. Acesso negado.	17		
Calculadora		Clique em Repetir para tentar novamente, em Ignorar para ignorar este arquivo (não recomendado) ou em Cancelar para cancelar a instalação.		Cancelar	
blocker.py		Anular Repetir Ignorar			
mb3-setup-con					Windows 8 Pr
6	o 🖭 💽				Build 920

0xF. Browser extensions are AV clients

Javascript Injection

```
% inject script
function CanInjectScript() {
    return !!NMH.getPort();
}
% DOM modification
  chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, {
            "verb": "get-dom-info"
        }, function (response) {
% Server query
 }, function (response) {
            NMH.postMessage({
                method: "get-info-for-page",
                data: response || null
            });
        });
```

Content Modification

0x10. Android AVs are VERY weak

Android AVs: Static Filtering

<include domain="database"
<include domain="database"
<include domain="database"
<include domain="database"
<include domain="database"
</full-backup-content>

" path="networksecurity.db" />
 path="applocking.db" />
 path="call_blocking.db" />
 path="mobilesecurity-synced.db" />

Android AVs: Whitelisting

version 1

insert into whitelist(application name, overridden) values('com.dropbox.android', 0); insert into whitelist(application name, overridden) values('com.facebook.katana', 0); insert into whitelist(application name, overridden) values('com.facebook.orca', 0); insert into whitelist(application name, overridden) values('com.whatsapp', 0); insert into whitelist(application name, overridden) values('com.instagram.android', 0); insert into whitelist(application name, overridden) values('com.skype.raider', 0); insert into whitelist(application name, overridden) values('com.android.chrome', 0); insert into whitelist(application name, overridden) values('com.twitter.android', 0); insert into whitelist(application name, overridden) values('com.imdb.mobile', 0); insert into whitelist(application name, overridden) values('com.ebay.mobile', 0); insert into whitelist(application name, overridden) values('com.airbnb.android', 0); insert into whitelist(application name, overridden) values('com.google.android.gm', 0); insert into whitelist(application name, overridden) values('com.google.android.apps.maps', 0); insert into whitelist(application name, overridden) values('com.google.android.apps.plus', 0); insert into whitelist(application name, overridden) values('com.yahoo.mobile.client.android.mail', 0); insert into whitelist(application name, overridden) values('com.pinterest', 0); insert into whitelist(application name, overridden) values('com.google.android.youtube', 0); insert into whitelist(application name, overridden) values('com.waze', 0); insert into whitelist(application name, overridden) values('co.vine.android', 0);

Android AVs: Exploiting accessibility services

<string name="applock_setup_activity_accessibility_desc">

Let your antivirus monitor apps you install or uninstall, so you can apply locks to them </string>

<string name="applock_setup_activity_device_admin_desc">

Grant administrator permissions to prevent others from uninstalling your antivirus.

</string>

Future Directions

What to do now?

- AV companies must be more transparent about their decisions.
- Researchers have many opportunities to be explored.
- AV evaluations should be multi-dimensional

What do we use this knowledge for?

Publications



Terminator: A Secure Coprocessor to Accelerate Real-Time AntiViruses Using Inspection Breakpoints



HEAVEN: A Hardware-Enhanced AntiVirus ENgine to accelerate real-time, signature-based malware detection



``VANILLA" malware: vanishing antiviruses by interleaving layers and layers of attacks



HITB 2023, HACK IN THE BOX SECURITY CONFERENCE Apr 17-21, 2023, AMSTERDAM, NL

All You Always Wanted to Know About AntiViruses (and I had to hands-on to tell you!)

Thank you!

Contact: botacin@tamu.edu or @MarcusBotacin **My Website:** marcusbotacin.github.io



Marcus Botacin Texas A&M University, USA @MarcusBotacin

